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Foreword 
An important interface between economics and demography has been the issue of the 
effect of size on the relative welfare of one group vis-a-vis another. Well-known examples 
are the Easterlin framework for fertility dynamics and the work of Freeman, Welch, and 
others on the impact of birth cohort size on earnings differentials. The basic hypothesis 
underlying their work is that being a member of a larger birth cohort can have a deleteri- 
ous effect on one's life prospects, at least when these are expressed in terms of income or 
consumption aspirations. In this paper, Ross Boylan uses a queuing theoretic approach to 
examine the relationship between income and the size of groups defined in terms of educa- 
tional attainment, and more specifically, whether an individual holds a particular creden- 
tial such as a high school diploma or a college degree. In contrast to the work cited 
above, Boylan hypothesizes that, if markets work like queues, with an implicit matching 
between particular types of jobs and individuals with credentials, then an increase in rela- 
tive group size may result in an improvement in the relative welfare of the group. 
Boylan provides the following example: Suppose there are two kinds of jobs, middle 
and low income (say, $10 and $3 per hour), and that people either have a credential or 
not. Initially, credential holders all have $10 jobs, while the uncredentialled are split 
between low and middle income jobs. Then more people get credentials. As a result, 
some of the uncredentialled are driven out of the $10 jobs, but all those with credentials 
remain middle income. Thus, the income of those with credentials remains unchanged, 
but the average income of those without credentials falls. In the paper, Boylan general- 
izes from this simple model to that of a continuous distribution of income and more 
broadly defined credential groups. 
Empirically, the effects of credential group size on relative earnings are quite small. 
Nevertheless, one can imagine that with further development the queuing model might 
provide some additional insight about the earnings differentials that are often observed to 
exist between groups defined in terms of other demographic characteristics such as sex or 
race. 
Charles A. Calhoun 
Research Scholar and 
Acting Deputy Program Leader 
Population Program 
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Abstract 
Sociologists often claim that  larger structures, such as labor markets, 
can not be understood simply as an aggregation of individual exchanges. 
Yet most models we use are individualistic. This paper develops a queu- 
ing model which separates the distribution of individual characteristics 
from the structure of jobs, allowing a role for each. The model thus 
makes a sharp distinction between the value of a characteristic for an 
individual and its value for society, and eliminates the need t o  assume 
that  people are paid what they're worth. In such a model a group may 
impmve its standing relative t o  others as its size increases. This possi- 
bility is investigated as an explanation for the disproportionate income 
gains of those with high school and college diplomas. Analysis of some 
recent U.S. da ta  with a queuing model show small effects of group size 
on these income gains, although regression based analysis might lead 
one t o  conclude that  size effects are large. 
'I would like to thank James Coleman, Nathan Keyfitz, James March, Robert Mare, John 
Meyer, and Nancy Brandon Tuma, for their comments on the work here. Many other partic- 
ipants at colloquia also gave me valuable feedback. The International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis provided facilities to complete this work. The Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research provided this study's data, which originated with the U. S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Stanford University provided computer 
resources. None of them bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations herein. 
This paper focuses on a narrow question, which grows out of some more 
general concerns. The narrow question is whether the size of different edu- 
cational groups affects the income of those groups. This question stems from 
concerns about how education operates in the labor market and, indeed, how 
the labor market operates in general. And behind these concerns lie general 
issues of modeling social structure, combining micro and macro processes, and 
the appropriateness of regressions as theory- testing tools. This paper's general 
theme is that a familiar sociological truth-that social structure counts-has 
yet to penetrate many of our mathematical models or empirical analyses very 
far, and that a rigorous working through of this truth will yield some surprises 
and some benefits. The particular approach taken below intends to illustrate 
that point, rather than to provide the definitive answer to the question of how 
the labor market works. 
People with more education make more money (Blau and Duncan, 1967; 
Featherman and Hauser, 1978; Jencks and et al., 1979; Kelley, 1973; Min- 
cer, 1974), not only in the U.S. but worldwide (Heyneman and Loxley, 1983). 
Although neoclassical economics takes this as a sign that the more educated 
are more productive, the evidence suggests productivity differences caused by 
education, if they exist at all, are much less than pay differences. This conclu- 
sion follows both from individual level studies and aggregate dynamic analyses 
(Berg, 1970; Berg et al., 1981; Collins, 1971; Collins, 1979; Lockheed et al., 
1980; Benavot, 1985). These results fit the general finding that productivity, 
whatever its causes, seldom matches income (Frank, 1984; Medoff and Abra- 
ham, 1981; Thurow, 1968). Of course, measures of productivity apart from 
pay are difficult to obtain, and all studies which attempt such measurement 
are open to criticism. But this measurement difficulty suggests an important 
theoretical problem, for the best developed theory of income determination, 
human capital theory of neoclassical economics, holds that productivity deter- 
mines income. The scientific status of the theory is thus questionable, since it 
rests so heavily on an unobservable. Further, something which agents gener- 
ally can not observe will only determine pay if some strong assumptions are 
true. In contrast, the model below requires only that employers know which 
kind of people they would prefer to hire (given a job with a fixed wage rate), 
and that employees know which kind of jobs they would prefer to take. 
Discussion of race and sex discrimination often treats these as aberrations 
in an otherwise meritocratic market which pays people what they are worth. 
However, the results above suggest the basic view of how markets function 
needs to be reconsidered, and considerable evidence supports this claim (Al- 
belda et a]., 1987; Granovetter, 1985; Kalleberg and S@rensen, 1979; Lester, 
1954; Piore, 1979; Thurow, 1975; Thurow, 1983). Economists are aware that 
the neoclassical theory of the labor market has problems, and have suggested 
a variety of ingenious repairs.' However, all hold that in some average sense 
groups receive the value of what they produce. Given that this assumption 
appears to contradict the scattered available evidence, it seems worthwhile to 
pursue models which do not make such an assum~t ion .~  
How might markets work, if not by rewarding productivity? One possibility 
is that characteristics such as race, gender, age, and education have a social 
value, determined by political struggles and other institutional processes. In 
this view, social structure enters into the market by setting the rules under 
which the market operates, for example, 'pay $1,000 more for a high school 
diploma." However, given a set of rules, the total market outcome is simply 
the aggregation of the individ~aal outcomes; if the people who were on the 
market changed (for example, if more college graduates entered the market) 
the aggregate outcome would change (more people would earn more money). 
Another possibility is that a set of positions exist, and that people and 
'screening theory suggests that employers use education and other traits as signals of 
productive ability, even if the signals do not cause productive ability (Spence, 1974). More 
recent efficiency wage arguments propose several reasons that productivity might depend 
on pay (e.g., higher wages reduce turnover, aid discipline, boost morale, satisfy equity con- 
siderations, impede unionization, promote health, save on contract renegotiation expense) 
(Bulow and Summers, 1986; Stiglitz, 1984; Yellen, 1984). 
2See the above literature for some of the arguments on this point. It may be useful to 
highlight some of the theoretical reasons competitive market pressures might not equate pay 
and marginal product. First, the limits of human and organizational rationality imply that 
competition will never be Uperfect," and that untrue beliefs may become widely shared. 
Second, various institutional processes shape the market quite apart from the actions of 
supply and demand. Third, productivity may be so intricately bound to the social world (so 
that only certain kinds of people are deemed appropriate for certain roles) that the technical 
concept of a marginal product of an asocial producer can be seriously misleading. 
groups compete for these positions. Social structure enters these models in 
a double sense: first, by determining the rules of the competition, and, sec- 
ond, by determining the positions which exist. From this perspective, the 
aggregate market is not the sum of the individual exchanges in it-if the in- 
dividuals on the market changed, the total distribution of jobs would remain 
the same. More modestly, the processes which distribute individuals among 
jobs are not tightly linked to those which determine the aggregate structure of 
jobs. This claim is the thrust of much recent structural theorizing about the 
labor market, and this paper adopts that perspective. However, the focus of 
this paper differs from that of much structural research, and those differences 
and their significance merit some discussion. With that background, the paper 
proceeds to develop a simple structural model of the the labor market, and 
uses that model to analyze the relation between education, group size, and 
income. These results are contrasted with those from regression analysis, and 
a conclusion returns to some of the larger issues behind the analysis. 
1 The Need for a Structural Account of In- 
dividual Success 
This paper focuses on individual attainment, and thus differs from much recent 
structural research. Indeed, the "new structuralismn was born in an explicit 
effort to shift the emphasis of stratification research from the study of in- 
dividual success and failure to the study of the structures or "empty spaces" 
occupied by people. Different analysts emphasize different forces shaping these 
structures-political, organizational, institutional, or economic-but all agree 
that the structures can not be understood simply as aggregations of individual 
 exchange^.^ This general claim is an old one is sociology. 
However, the structural account is incomplete without an account of indi- 
vidual attainment, for the attainments of individuals, taken collectively, must 
match the structure of the market even if the market can not meaningfully be 
understood as  arising from those attainments. There lies the problem which 
motivated the development of the model below: existing models of individ- 
ual attainment provide one account of what the aggregate market looks like 
3See Baron, 1984 and Althauser, 1987 for recent reviews. 
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(the whole is simply the sum of the individual outcomes); structural theories 
provide another (the whole is the product a various larger political, organi- 
zational, institutional and economic forces); and the two accounts will not 
generally match.4 The structural account of the labor market will not be com- 
plete until it can offer an alternative account of how individuals are distributed 
among positions in the economy. 
These claims may seem surprising, for structural studies have examined 
individual attainment, even if this has not been their main concern. However, 
the methods used have generally been variants on individualist ones. The 
typical structural study of individual attainment shows that the relationship 
between personal characteristics and outcomes depends on structural position, 
for example that education is rewarded more strongly in some sectors than 
others (Beck et al., 1978; Stolzenberg, 1978; Dickens and Lang, 1984, are 
representative). As demonstrations that structure counts, these exercises are 
quite successful; as complete models of attainment, they are less satisfactory, 
for two reasons. First, the distribution of people across sectors is often assumed 
rather than modeled, so there is no way of saying how the distribution would 
change if the people or the structure changed. Second, outcomes which are 
modeled, whether sectoral location, income, or employment, are modeled in 
a way which undercuts the structural perspective. That is, the outcome is a 
function of the characteristics of the person, as in a regression equation. This 
specification implies that if the aggregate characteristics of the people on the 
market changed, the aggregate outcomes-the structure of the market-would 
change in an exactly corresponding fashion. So such models are less structural 
than they appear. 
Of course, many of the investigators probably did not intend that their 
analyses be taken quite so rigorously as models. They wished to show that 
structure mattered, and they did so; they did not intend that the estimates be 
taken as parameters of some underlying process which would remain constant 
while the structure or demography of the market changed. On the other hand, 
some may have intended a sort of soft structural model, one in which there 
4Structurd models of individual attainment do exist, most notably in models of vacancy 
chains (Starensen, 1977; White, 1970). Also, models of mobility tables generally assume 
that people are distributed across a fixed set of positions (Boudon, 1974; Featherman and 
Hauser, 1978). However, none of these models has the generality of regressions, which can 
describe how an arbitrary set of characteristics affect a continuously distributed outcome. 
was no rigidly pre-existing structure of jobs and income. The models above 
may be appropriate for that. 
However, the central theme of much of the verbal theorizing about the 
labor market is that there is a fairly sharp separation between the processes 
generating the job structure and those which distribute people among jobs. 
It is common to think of the labor market this way: for example, a changing 
political climate and the internationalization of capital has eliminated many 
middle-income jobs; the baby boom has entered the market. Yet we do not 
have a very rigorous way of tracing through the distributional effects of these 
changes on different groups; the models most commonly used undercut the 
structural perspective which motivates the questions. Thus a truly structural 
account of individual attainment is needed for more than logical completeness 
of structural theory; it is needed to understand and predict how different 
groups will fare under changing conditions. The following sections illustrate 
one such model and contrast it with more conventional regression models.' 
2 A Queuing Model 
2.1 Background 
This section develops a model which formalizes some existing theories of the 
labor market. Structural analyses of the labor market hold that jobs exist apart 
from the people who fill them, and that the market is an arena in which jobs 
and people match (Granovetter, 1981). Many models would be consistent with 
that view; this paper pursues a particularly fruitful and simple one. Thurow 
(1975) suggested regarding the labor market as two queues: one queue has jobs, 
ranked by their desirability to employees; the other queue has people, ranked 
by their desirability to Importantly, wages attach to jobs rather 
than people. The model below makes the additional assumption that jobs 
are ranked by their wages. An error term will account for the approximation 
involved in this assumption. These assumptions are undoubtedly heroic, more 
6The general neoclassical model does have a supply and demand side. While such an 
approach can at least partially incorporate structural and demographic change, it is not the 
only way to  do so. For reasons given above, this paper pursues an alternative account. 
'Thurow emphasized training costs for ranking people; the approach here is more 
agnostic. 
applicable to some parts of the market than others. A full defense of their 
plausibility would require a recapitulation of the debates cited above; suffice it 
to say these assumptions seem as reasonable a way of characterizing the labor 
market those of the neoclassical model. The intent of this article is not to prove 
one model right or wrong, but to show that the question of how the market 
works is critical, that exact specification of an answer to that question has some 
benefits, and that more structural models of the market can be developed. 
This verbal formulation of a queuing model suffices to make some points. 
The image of a queue suggests that if one person moves up in the queue, for 
example by getting more education, he or she does so by bumping other people 
down in the queue. The assumption that wages attach to jobs, which exist 
apart from people, implies that people do not necessarily get what they're 
"worth." Like all structural approaches, this one suggests viewing wealth and 
poverty as the result of social processes rather than as the result of individual 
virtue or deficiency. This viewpoint has immediate implications for virtually 
all labor market policy research: inferences from the micro to the macro level 
may not be warranted. For example, a job training program raises the income 
and employment of participants. Would it affect poverty if widely applied? 
Not if participants are simply displacing others into less desirable positions. 
Another example: a welfare program reduces labor force participation. If 
widely applied, would it reduce economic activity? Not if participants are 
simply yielding positions to others. The widespread practice of applying micro 
relationships to yield macro estimates of the impact of government programs 
rests on unexamined assumptions about the market. 
However, words alone can not answer some other questions. The verbal 
model makes clear that the distribution of income may change apart from any 
changes in individuals (e.g., a recession, or deindustrialization, or an assault 
on unions), but it doesn't predict how different groups will fare. Nor does it 
help in predicting the effects of population change (e.g., a baby boom or a rise 
in the number of college graduates). Nor does it predict the effects of changes 
in the matching and ranking process, such as a decline in discrimination. For 
that a formal mathematical model is required, and to that we now turn. 
2.2 The Formal Model 
The model here requires three things: 
a set of jobs, with wages 
a set of people, with characteristics 
a rule for ranking people. 
Given these three things, the model matches the people to the jobs. Since 
the rule for ranking people has a random element, the model can not predict 
precisely where an individual or group will end up, but (like all probabilistic 
models) it predicts the likely distribution of outcomes. 
The operation of the model is simple: jobs are ranked by their wages; people 
are ranked according to the ranking procedure (details below); and the people 
and jobs are matched. The top person gets the top job; the second-ranked 
person gets the second-ranked job, and so on. If there are more people than 
jobs, the lowest ranked people are unemployed. 
The last detail is the ranking rule, a device to express the fact that personal 
characteristics influence queue position, but they do so somewhat randomly. 
The rule specifies that ranking proceeds as follows: 
1. Assign everyone a score 
2. Rank everyone by the scores they receive. 
Scores are random functions of personal characteristics; mathematically 
where s;  is the score for individual i, X; is a vector of characteristics (e.g., 
age, education, race, sex), e; is an error term, and f is a function relating the 
characteristics to the score. The function and the error term must be specified 
(or estimated) before operation of the model. Equation (1) will be called the 
score equation. 
2.3 Interpretation 
The score is an index of overall desirability of a person to employers. Clearly, 
the model will be more successful when employers have a consensual ranking 
of individuals, although certain departures from consensus are captured by the 
error term. However, it is important to emphasize that the score most likely 
is not a direct measure of quality or productivity; it can just as well reflect 
prejudice or unfounded beliefs about the value of certain traits. 
The error term reflects unobserved differences among individuals, but it 
also reflects chance: identical people may get different jobs simply because 
they arrive on the market at different places or times. 
Application: Education, Credentials, 
and Group Size 
This section presents an application of the queuing model developed above. 
The goal is both to show that the model can fit the data, and to illustrate 
the new kinds of theoretical issues which the model raises. Unlike neoclassical 
economics, the queuing model suggests that larger groups may have relatively 
better outcomes in the labor market, and this paper investigates the rela- 
tionship between the exceptional size of certain educational groups and their 
exceptional income. 
3.1 Theoretical Discussion 
Analysis focuses on a particular puzzle, credentials effects, which analysts have 
thought might illuminate some more general features of the labor market. 
Credentials effects are the additional gains in income and status associated 
with a holding a certificate of graduation. Most analysts find that the year 
of school in which one gets a certificate is worth more than other years of 
schooling (Blaug, 1976; Jencks and et al., 1979; Layard and Psacharopoulos, 
1974). This finding has provoked considerable controversy, for it suggests that 
employers reward certificates rather than underlying productive ability (which, 
it seems reasonable to assume, schools impart in a fairly continuous manner). 
All sides to the debate agree that if certificate holders get more it is because 
there is something distinctive about them or the certificates they hold. 
The debate over credentials has focused only on the distinctiveness of the 
credentials or the credential holders, but has overlooked the demography of 
the market. Consider Figures 1 or 2. These describe the two samples analyzed 
below, but typify the whole population. The solid line shows the average 
earnings of each educational group; it takes sharp jumps at high school and 
college ~omplet ion.~ The dashed histogram shows the number of people at each 
grade level; it too jumps at the credential points, particularly 12'th grade, high 
school diploma. Could the large size of these groups be a cause of the income 
jumps?' 
Indeed, general theoretical debate over education has emphasized the sheer 
role of numbers. Some have argued that the value of education is relative, 
rather than absolute. A high school diploma may put one at the top of the 
labor market if no one else has such a diploma, or at the bottom if everyone 
else has gone to college. The value of any particular level of education depends 
on the size distribution of the different educational groups. This is precisely 
the viewpoint of the queuing model: the value of a given score depends on the 
distribution of the scores of others. 
Thus, this paper will attend particularly to group size. Note that the 
population in question is those in the labor market; the groups consist of those 
with different levels of education. Throughout this paper group size means the 
number of people on the market who have completed a given level of schooling. 
Size eflects refer to the eflect of changing group size on the income of that 
gro up. 
Neoclassical economics suggests that larger groups should be a t  a disad- 
vantage on the labor market. The failure of returns to college to fall as the 
number of college graduates increased has been emphasized by critics of the 
neoclassical theory (Boudon, 1974; Thurow, 1975), and a queuing perspective 
can give a radically different analysis of group size. 
How? Suppose that employers place no special value on diplomas, but 
they value each year of education in a strong sense: they always prefer to 
hire someone with more education to hiring someone with less. Thus all those 
with n years of education will rank above all those with less education in the 
queue of people.g The ranking this produces is shown in Figure 3, with people 
7 ~ s  subsequent analysis and the studies cited above show, this pattern persists after 
controls. 
"t is plausible that people are drawn to these schooling levels by the associated benefits; 
it is also plausible that widely held beliefs that it is good to graduate cause both the concen- 
tration of people and the jump in income. The analysis below asks what the consequences 
of size are, regardless of the source of that size. 
g ~ h i s  assumes all people are on the market at once and employers have perfect infor- 
mation. These assumptions serve only to simplify exposition, and will be dropped in the 
empirical analysis. 
ranked in a queue on the right and jobs ranked in a queue on the left. For 
simplicity, assume the distribution of income is uniform. In that case, the 
mean income of each educational group is shown by the horizontal bars in the 
center of the figure. The vertical distance between these bars indicates the 
mean income gain associated with completing each additional year of school. 
The crucial point is that the gain associated with going from grade 11 to  12 is 
greater than the gain from 10 to 11. The larger gain is the result of the large 
number of twelfth graders, not the special treatment by employers of high 
school graduates. 12'th graders are an unusually large group, and so occupy 
an unusually large range of jobs and income. Thus the jump in average income 
between l l ' t h  and 12'th grade is exceptional. 
The queuing framework thus introduces a distinction between the effects 
of characteristics on the matching process and their effects on outcomes. In 
this case, credentials may have no special effect in matching while retaining a 
large effect on outcomes. But the effects are size effects. 
Ranking eflects will refer to  the effect of a characteristic in the matching 
competition; mathematically they refer to the the relation between character- 
istics, such as education, and scores in the score equation (1). Outcome eflects 
will refer to  the association between characteristics and income. 
Of course, it is quite possible that credentials do have a special effect in 
the matching process, so the queuing framework does not require that size 
effects cause the credential outcomes. It does, however, call into question the 
interpretation of the observed credentials effects in regressions. 
The value of an additional year of school thus depends on three things: 
the distribution of job opportunities, 
the distribution of competitors and their attributes, 
the extent to  which that year of schooling helps in the struggle for queue 
position. 
Discussion so far has ignored job opportunities, but these clearly matter as 
well. The income gained by moving past a given number of people depends 
on the jobs one is moving past as well; moving up a few jobs at the top of the 
income distribution (which has relatively few jobs in each income interval) will 
produce larger income gains than moving past the same number of jobs in the 
middle of the income distribution. 
In short, this example shows that a trait may be valuable not because of 
intrinsic qualities of the trait, but because of the size of the group with the 
trait. Since the model above, in general, traces outcomes t o  the interaction 
of jobs, demography, and the competitive value of characteristics, the relative 
weights of the three factors is an empirical question. Discussion now turns to  
the empirical analysis. 
3.2 Data 
Samples 
This study uses two subsamples of the Current Population Survey, a household- 
based survey of the civilian noninstitutionalized population of the U.S.1° The 
first subsample contains only those who moved between employers; the second 
contains movers and stayers aged 40-55; both are restricted to  white males 
with positive earnings in 1979. Earnings data were collected for all those aged 
15 and over. The March, 1980 survey (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, 1984) provided information about labor force experience over the 
entire calendar year 1979, a business cycle peak with an unemployment rate 
of 5.8%. 
The sample restrictions by race, sex, and earnings, though fairly conven- 
tional, merit brief discussion. 
Race and Sex Many argue that markets are segmented by race, or sex, or 
both, and previous work with this model suggested such segmentation 
(Boylan, 1986). Analysis of separate race-sex groups seems the safest 
course, since throwing non-competing groups together in one market is 
clearly wrong, while separating competing groups may still yield valid 
estimates of the effects of education within groups. Small sample size 
precluded the analysis of blacks. Since the analysis of women would 
1°The institutionalized population generally does not compete on the labor market, so 
its omission should cause no problem. The military does compete with civilian jobs, and 
particularly near-but not at-the bottom of the labor market this is significant (Mare and 
Winship, 1984). It also screens on somewhat different characteristics than those used for 
civilian jobs. The net effect is difficult to gauge; it is likely to be largest for blacks, who 
are excluded from this analysis, and for youth, who are present in only one of the analyzed 
subsamples. So, while the omission is unfortunate, meaningful analysis of the rest of the 
labor force should be possible. 
raise complex issues of labor force participation, this study analyzes only 
males. 
Earnings The queuing model does not require exclusive focus on those with 
positive earnings, and such a restriction obviously introduces sample se- 
lection bias. Why make the restriction? First, regression models typi- 
cally do employ such a restriction, and its use enhances comparability of 
results. Second, the restriction to those with positive earnings simplifies 
both the mechanics and exposition of the model. 
Concern with selecting a theoretically appropriate sample drives the def- 
inition of the mover sample. In the queuing model everyone competes with 
everyone else for the available jobs. Many jobs inside organizations are only 
open to those already in the organization, and so should be excluded from the 
scope of the model. The mover sample meets this theoretical concern as much 
as is practical, by including only those who made or attempted a move between 
employers. However, this restriction in turn raises problems, for it reduces the 
sample to slightly more than 116 of those in the labor force, and includes 
many teenagers with questionable labor force attachment. As a check, paral- 
lel analyses were carried out on a mature (ages 40 to 55) male sample which 
excludes teenagers and includes all those in the labor force, people who stay 
in the same firm as well as movers. Further, to the extent that age segments 
markets, narrower age ranges are more appropriate for analysis. Ages 40 to 
55 are the peak years of average earnings (Mincer, 1974, chapter 4). Thus, 
the analysis of this age group can be interpreted as covering the long run or 
maximal effect of education on earnings. 
Table 1 reports the sizes of the different samples. 
Variables 
Table 2 compares the different samples across selected variables. The labor 
force status variables distinguish labor force participants from non-participants 
and movers from non-movers. The demographic information is conventional, 
except for experience, which is years since graduation." 
"Experience was constructed as age-(education+6), or age-14 if education was less than 
8 years. In a few cases this procedure produced negative experience; it was recoded to 0 as 
reported in Table 3. 
The natural logarithm of hourly earnings is the study's dependent variable. 
Hourly earnings are total earned income divided by an estimate of total hours 
worked (= typical hours per week times total weeks worked in 1979). The 
phrase "hourly earnings," rather than "wage," underlines this variable's inclu- 
sion of salary as well as wages, and its constructed nature. A small fraction of 
extreme values were recoded, as reported in Table 3. 
Movers are younger, poorer, and work less than white males as a group, 
while the reverse holds for mature white males. Their educational levels are 
roughly equal. 
3.3 Methods 
Overview 
I will first fit a queuing model to the data, to provide a baseline for further 
analysis and to demonstrate that such a model can yield a good fit. This 
baseline model uses the observed income distribution and observed group sizes, 
and it allows special effects of credentials directly in the ranking process. The 
remainder of the analysis separates out the effects of size from the effects of 
credent ialling. 
Recall that in the preceding example each year of education had the same 
ranking effect (effect on scores which determine ranking), yet each grade had 
different outcome effects (effects on income), so that the observed credential 
outcome effects were really size effects, attributable to the large number of 
people with credentials. That example was simplified, and really only demon- 
strated the theoretical possibility that size effects might matter. Empirically, 
how big are they? 
The first variant model, after the baseline model, tests the importance of 
pure size effects. It does so by constraining the ranking effect of each year of 
education to be the same. For these data, the credentials (outcome) effects 
produced by this pure size model essentially do not exist. The reasons for this 
are discussed. 
A second variant model considers the possibility that size matters in in- 
teraction with credential ranking effects. It does so by simulating a match- 
ing process in which each grade level has the same number of people. This 
modestly reduces the credential outcome effects. Again, size effects are weak. 
Credential outcome effects stem largely from credential ranking effects. 
The model is unconventional, but the analysis follows a conventional pat- 
tern: fit parameters under various specifications and then interpret them. The 
model is more complex than a typical regression model, so interpretation re- 
quires simulation rather than simply reading coefficients. Some people familiar 
with the results have expressed frustration that this is not a test of the model 
(see Boylan, 1986 for such an effort), but that is not the intent of this paper, 
which seeks, rather, to show how such a model can be used to answer the ques- 
tion "how big are size effects?" Like all analysis, this one assumes a certain 
framework, and then answers questions within it. The next major section of 
the paper will compare these results with those obtained from a more conven- 
tional regression framework. This section, however, concerns the mechanics 
and results of the queuing analysis. 
Queuing Models  
Analysis using the queuing model developed above poses two distinct problems: 
parameter estimation and parameter interpretation. Discussion takes up each 
in turn. 
Parameter estimation for the score equation (1) faces an immediate prob- 
lem: the scores in the ranking process are not observable. The solution lies in 
noting that the scores are an artifice for saying that one group or individual 
ranks above or below another. Any set of scores which retain the same order- 
ing of people will do. By assumption, the wages of a job reflect its ranking 
and so that of the person who occupies the job. So it is sufficient to estimate 
a regression of log wages on personal characteristics, and then reinterpret the 
dependent variable as a score. Thus, the queuing model interprets regression 
parameters as measuring relative standing rather than pay, and the relation 
between traits and scores, rather than between traits and income, is assumed 
constant. To estimate the parameters of a score equation it suffices to estimate 
the corresponding regression of wages on personal characteristics.I2 
Parameter interpretation proceeds by simulation. This simulation proce- 
dure is essential, since the parameters of the model yield only the effects of 
characteristics on ranking, not on outcomes (income). Given parameter es- 
timates and a set of people and jobs, the model can be simulated on the 
12See the appendix of Boylan, 1986, for a rigorous justification of this procedure. 
computer to yield a possible matching of people and jobs. Since the simula- 
tion has a random element, multiple simulations are needed to uncover the 
average tendency. Each simulation yields a matching of people to jobs, and a 
conventional regression is performed on this simulated sample to summarize 
the relation between personal characteristics and income. This analysis will 
focus on the education-income relationship, particularly on the size of creden- 
tial dummy variables. The mean and standard deviation of each coefficient 
across all simulations will be reported. 
Readers without a taste for technical detail may wish to skip to the next 
subsection, or even to the results. A more detailed description follows. 
At this point it will be useful to introduce some notation and some regres- 
sion models which will figure in the analysis. The regression models have two 
roles: first, they will summarize both the actual data and the results of model 
simulation; second, some of them will form the basis for the score equation 
which describes the ranking process in the model. 
Let S refer to years of schooling, X to years of experience, and D, to a 
dummy equal to 1 for those with n or more years of schooling, 0 otherwise. 
log(w) is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings (w for wage). A typical 
regression model is 
S2 and X 2  are squares of the corresponding terms; S X  is schooling times 
experience; e is an error term. 
Equation (2) is one of the more flexible forms used in one of the major 
empirical works in the human capital tradition (Mincer, 1974, p. 92). If that 
equation is further simplified, so that log(w) is a linear function of education 
alone, it becomes "the fundamental empirical relationshipn used in the human 
capital literature (Rosen, 1977, p. 12). 
Credentialists add dummy variables for diplomas: 
7 2 ,  for example, could be called a "high school diploma effect." If the 7 are 
statistically significant, then there is something to be explained. While it is 
common to interpret them directly as credential effects, the arguments above 
suggest some portion of these effects may be size effects. A regression of this 
form will be used to summarize the relationship between education and income 
for both the observed and simulated samples. 
A typical queuing analysis proceeds as follows: first, one specifies a score 
equation. Analysis below employs two equations, one like equation (3) with 
score as the dependent variable, and the other 
The former equation allows the ranking effects of each year of education to vary 
with grade level, and includes credential ranking effects. The latter equation 
holds that 3, the score used in ranking, is affected equally by each year of 
schooling (crlS). This differs from the other specification in omitting quadratic 
and interaction terms involving schooling. 
With this background, a detailed description of a prototypical parameter 
estimation and interpretation is possible. 
Estimate the parameters of the score equation by estimating a regression 
with log wages as the dependent variable. Simulation can then proceed, given 
a set of people and jobs. Generally the observed sample is used, but for one 
analysis, described below, this is not the case. In any case, the simulation 
ignores information about which people have which jobs and provides its own 
matching of people and jobs. 
Each simulation proceeds as follows: 
1. Rank the jobs by their wages, with the highest paying ranked first. 
2. Rank the people. 
(a) Assign each person a score according to the score equation and pa- 
rameters. This equation includes an error term; draw a random 
variable with the distribution of the error term (by computer sim- 
ulation) and add this to the rest of the equation. 
(b) Once all people have scores, rank people by their scores. 
3. Match the people to jobs, top-ranked person to top-ranked job, second 
person to second job, and so on.I3 
13Usually some people would not have jobs, but these simulations concern samples of 
employed people only. 
4. Estimate the coefficients of equation (3) for this simulated sample and 
record the coefficients. D12 and Dl6, the credential dummies, will be of 
most interest. 
All analyses employ 200 simulations. The results consist of the mean and 
standard deviation across all simulations of each coefficient (e.g., Dl2) esti- 
mated in the last step.14 
Alternative Models 
The "basic simulation" uses equation (3), which has credential dummies, as 
the score equation and uses the observed sample of people and jobs as the 
basis for simulation. 
The "No Credentials" model uses equation (4), in which each year of edu- 
cation has the same ranking effects, as the score equation. Simulation employs 
the observed sample of people and jobs. Any credentials effects observed in 
such a model stem purely from the interaction of group size and the income 
distribution. 
The "Equal Sizes" model uses the same score equation as the basic simu- 
lation, but employs simulations in which each group has the same size.15 
The models explore the importance of group size in producing the observed 
credentials effects. The No Credentials model asks how important size effects 
are without any credential ranking effects, while the Equal Size model asks 
how large size effects are in the presence of credential ranking effects. 
3.4 Results 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the analysis for the samples of movers 
and mature males respectively. The first column, labelled "Actual Data," 
reports the observed relation between education, experience, and income in 
14The standard deviation simply shows how precise these estimates of mean values are. 
They refer to uncertainty concerning the simulations, not uncertainty stemming from the 
fact that we have one of many possible samples. 
15Actually, only the population above grade 6 was equalized, since there were so few cases 
below that level. For each simulation a hypothetical sample of people was drawn. This 
sample had exactly the same people as in the original sample below grade 7. Above grade 
6, the original sample in each grade was sampled with replacement n times, where n is 1/12 
the total observed sample size in grades 7-18. 
the samples. It is the credential dummies, D12 and D16 which are of interest; 
these measure the additional benefits of diplomas beyond those of a typical 
year of education. For movers, DI2 is .172, indicating a high school diploma 
raises log wages by .172, i.e., about a 17% increase in wages. This effect 
is substantively large and statistically significant (standard deviation is only 
.024). In contrast, a college diploma raises movers' wage by only about 6%, 
and this effect is not statistically significant. However, in the mature sample 
it is the college degree which has the greatest effect (about 19%) while high 
school is worth 8%. Both effects are significant. This pattern reflects the 
delayed payoff to higher education. 
Can the queuing model fit the data? As the 'Basic Simulationn column 
shows, it can. For this simulation, equation (3), which has credential effects, 
was used for the score equation, and the model was then simulated using the 
observed sample of people and jobs. The results here will be the baseline for 
two comparisons, one with a simulation without credential ranking effects, and 
the second with a simulation with credentials but with equal group sizes.16 
The 'No Credentials" column reports the results of simulation in which 
equation (4), which gives each year of education the same ranking effect, is 
used as the score equation. Any credential outcome effects which arise must 
then be the result of the interaction of group size and the job distribution. 
Although the simple example above showed that such effects could, in principle, 
be substantial, they are not here. All credential dummies are small, 1% or less, 
and the only statistically significant one is negative. 
Why aren't the size effects more important? When groups are cleanly 
separated, as in Figure 3, the size of a group 'belongsn to that group alone, in 
the sense that increasing the size of a group increases the spread of that group 
but no others. However, when groups overlap, increasing the size of one group 
also increases the spread of groups which overlap with it. In effect, the size of 
a group 'belongsn to all groups which overlap that group, so group size has no 
effects which are focussed on the one group. Figure 4 provides an illustration. 
In the top panel, 11th and 12th graders are separated completely, while in the 
16Why not compare these later simulations with the actual data? Such comparisons mix 
two effects: the effects of changes in the assumptions (e.g., no credential ranking effects), and 
discrepancien caused by the simple functional forms used in the score equations. Comparison 
with the basic simulation isolates the former, which is of theoretical interest. 
bottom panel they are not. The left hand side shows the situation with equal 
group sizes; the right hand side shows the effects of doubling the size of the 
12th grade group. The overall income distribution is the same in all cases, 
and small tables summarize the effect of each grade on income. Note that 
when there is no overlap (top panel), increasing a group's size increases the 
earnings gap between that group and other groups, but has no effect on the 
gaps between the other groups (i.e., the income gap from grade 11 to 12 and 12 
to 13 increases when the size of grade 12 increases, but the gap between 10 and 
11 remains unchanged). In contrast, with overlap (bottom panel), increasing 
the size of the 12th grade has a smaller effect than before, and it also affects 
the 11 th grade. 
In short, overlap diminishes the importance of size, since increases in the 
size of one group affect overlapping groups as well. In this case the effect of 
each grade is only 115 or 1/6 of the standard error (in the ranking procedure), 
so size doesn't make much difference. 
This argument shows that overlap diminishes size effects; however, size may 
still be important in interaction with credential ranking effects, which increase 
group separation. To test this, a final set of simulations used equation (3), with 
credentials, as the score equation, but equalized the size of the different groups. 
These simulations matched the observed income distribution to a hypothetical 
sample of people in which there were the same number of people in each grade. 
This does diminish the credential outcome effects, by a maximum of 13% for 
mature high school graduates (from .070 to .061). The other effects are more 
modest, ranging from about 2 to 8%. 
In short, these analyses suggest that, for these data, size effects make only 
minor contributions to observed credentials effects, and that the distinctive 
value of credentials in the ranking process is critical.17 While such a conclu- 
 h he safest conclusion is that size effects are small. Either credential ranking effects or 
the job distribution or their interaction could account for the credential outcome effects. 
The first of these seems most likely for several reasons. For the income distribution to  cause 
the observed effects, it would have to  have an irregular shape which would have a special 
effect on one group. This is unlikely because overlap is so extensive that this is not possible, 
and because the equal size simulation caused different grade levels t o  match up with portions 
of the income distribution other than those they matched in the original sample. Since the 
credentials effects persisted, ranking effects seem to be the cause. Additional simulations 
with artificial job distributions would make this conclusion definitive. This paper concerns 
size effects, so analysis stops here. 
sion supports the usual interpretation of the credentials effects, note that the 
mechanism is somewhat different. In the usual interpretation, employers value 
credentials and will pay more for them. If so, a regression model is actually the 
correct model of the labor market. In this model, in contrast, employers have 
already fixed the wage for their jobs, but pay particular attention to whether 
a person has a credential in deciding how to  fill the job. This contrast suggests 
a more extended consideration of regression models, and to  that I now turn. 
4 A Contrast with Regressions as Models 
The dominant theory testing strategy in the social sciences proceeds from some 
verbal formulation to  a specification such as 
outcome; = alX1; + a2X2; + . . . + anXn; + c; ( 5 )  
where the X are independent variables, a are coefficients (to be estimated 
from the data) and c is an error term. The subscript i refers to the i'th 
unit (person, state, organization). The coefficients receive names in view of 
the theoretical discussion, and are interpreted in that light. In contrast, the 
strategy taken above was to  translate a verbal model into a mathematical 
description of process, and then to  analyze that process. In this particular 
case, the choice of strategy makes a difference. This suggests that the usual 
interpretive weight put on regression results may be excessive. 
In a regression-style analysis, the theoretical arguments of this paper be- 
come arguments about coefficients on credential dummy variables, as in equa- 
tion (3). The argument that the size of a group is important would be tested 
by adding some size variables to the right-hand side of the equation. An ap- 
pendix describes the results of such tests in detail, but the overall results are 
easy to  summarize: 
1. The importance of size is variable and sensitive to  the exact specification. 
2. Some of the estimated size effects are substantial, much larger than those 
found in the queuing analysis above. 
An irony: the queuing approach suggested that size effects might be im- 
portant, yet it is the regression analyses, rather than the queuing analyses, 
which give them the greatest weight. 
This paper will not attempt to determine which of these models is more 
appropriate.18 However, it seems safe to conclude from this analysis that if size 
effects are important it is not because of the kind of queuing process described 
above. The goal of this paper is to show that regressions are not the only 
descriptions of the world, and the choice of model may affect the substantive 
conclusions one arrives at. 
Regressions, if interpreted rigorously as models, make strong assumptions 
about how the world works. They assume that macro analysis is an aggregation 
of micro analyses, so that, for example, the structure of the labor market is 
simply the aggregation of individual outcomes given by regression equations. 
One can add macroscopic variables to such equations, by making the outcome 
for an individual depend on the size of different groups, the overall state of 
the labor market, or the sectoral location of the individual. Yet this is less of 
a change than it would seem, for even with these additions the whole remains 
the sum of the parts. Such models predict that changing the mix of people 
will directly change the mix of outcomes. Much sociological theorizing, for the 
labor market and for other domains, argues against such a view. We should 
shape our models accordingly. 
Conclusion 
Many sociological platitudes are remarkably difficult to incorporate into our 
day to day analysis of the world. This has certainly been the case for the 
labor market. The theoretical claim that outcomes result from the interplay 
of the structure of jobs, the demography of people, and the matching process 
between the two is difficult to translate into empirical analysis; this paper 
illustrates an admittedly crude way it might be done. The queuing model 
makes the theoretical distinction between the value of a characteristic in a 
matching process and its value for outcomes such as income, and shows how 
demography and the job structure intervene. 
The finding that size effects are small is interesting from several points of 
view. First, it contrasts with the findings of some conventional regression mod- 
'"owever, the instability of the regression results indicates their sensitivity to the exact 
pattern of size and income, making it difficult to put much faith in any particular estimate. 
In contrast, the queuing model provides not only a consistent finding of minimal size effects 
but some reasons, related to group overlap, that this should be so. 
els, showing that the choice of strategy matters. Second, the size effects were 
generally positive: bigger groups gained. This contrast with the neoclassical 
theory again points to the importance of exactly specifying mechanisms.lg 
The queuing model suggested investigating size effects, but the finding that 
these are small does not invalidate the model. It could not, since the analysis 
which reached that conclusion assumed the queuing framework, and used it to 
assign relative weights to size, credentials, and the job structure. 
This assumption of the general model may seem troubling; certainly it 
implies that the results here do not prove that size effects are small, since 
they do not test the validity of the model. But is this any different from 
more conventional analyses? Regressions, with controls, find that education 
affects income and status. At the individual level, investigators assume that, 
if their controls are good enough, they are measuring how a person's income 
would change if they had a different level of education. But of course, one can 
not carry out this experiment, and the conclusion rests on the validity of the 
model. At the structural level, investigators have asked what the effects on 
the distribution of income and status would be if the distribution of education 
were equal, or at least more equal (Chiswick and Mincer, 1972; Jencks and 
etal, 1972). Their conclusion-that there would be an equalization, but only 
a small one-depends on the assumption that the market simply aggregates 
individual outcomes and that the parameters of the regression relationship 
would remain unchanged as other conditions varied. 
Thus routine data analysis rests as much on untested assumptions as the 
analysis of this paper. Further, the queuing approach here fits the data as 
well as regression models, so one can not be preferred to the other on grounds 
of fit. The queuing approach, seems, if anything, more consistent with our 
theories of the labor market and social structure in general, and with the facts 
those theories were built on. And, finally, the two approaches yield different 
conclusions about the same problems. While the queuing model above is an 
obvious simplification, these considerations suggest that the structural models 
in general merit further investigation. 
lgThe queuing model does not predict size effects are positive, it merely indicates that 
they may b e j u s t  as they may be negative given the right conditions. 
A Appendix: Regression Estimates of Size 
Effects 
A straight translation from Figure 3 is that the mean income of a group is a 
function of the total size of all lower educational groups and half the size of that 
group; call this variable M (for midpoint). This variable can be substituted for 
the schooling variable, or it can be used in conjunction with years of schooling: 
Alternately, a more conventional test for size effects looks at  the size of a 
group without totalling up the size of all "lower" groups. Letting G denote 
group size, this leads to 
It will be convenient to refer to equation (6) as the "cumulative size only 
equation," equation (7) as the "cumulative size equation," and equation (8) as 
the "group size" equation. 
If one believed there might be true size and credentials effects, the natural 
regressions would combine both: 
The P and 7 coefficient estimates can be compared with those of previous 
equations to see how credentials effects and size effects interact. 
Tables 6 and 7 display the results of these regressions for the mover and 
mature samples respectively.20 The dominant impression is one of instability 
20The size regressions for movers are based on a slightly smaller sample than the main 
results, size 9,511 rather than 9,560. I believe the discrepancy arises from the exclusion of 
some low income cases, but will check it. At any rate, all size regressions are carried out on 
the same sample, so comparisons across regressions should be reasonable. 
and contradictory interpretations. For the movers, the size effects are signifi- 
cant and substantively large21 without controls for credentials, and small and 
insignificant with controls. This suggests the apparent size effects are spuri- 
ous. However, some of the regressions with size effects have smaller credential 
dummies than those without such effects (compare the results for equations 
(9) and (10) with that for equation (3) for D12 and Dls), suggesting the esti- 
mated credentials effects were spuriously large when size was not considered. 
Then again, some of the credential dummies increase, and though some of the 
changes are marked (10% change in estimated credential effect), none are large 
relative to the errors of the coefficient estimates. 
The pattern for mature males is even less clear; the estimated size effect for 
M doubles when credential dummies are included, and one of the credential 
effects (Dl2) is cut in half while the other rises. For this sample, as for the 
other, the analyses based on cumulative size differ, even in qualitative features, 
from those based on group size. 
21Direct comparison with the simulation results is difficult. However, a rough estimate of 
the magnitude of size effects comes from multiplying the size coefficients by the observed 
sizes and then by the sizes which would hold under the hypothetical equal distribution 
across grade levels. For example, the mover sample has 3534 people in grade 12; an equal 
distribution of the population would have 771.8 people in that grade, i.e., 2762.2 fewer 
people. The G coefficient of .034 times this difference (2.76 when units are in 1,000's) is 
.094. This .094 reduction is large, being 55% of the observed credential effect of .172. Similar 
calculations can be carried out for other coefficients and samples; changes range from small 
increases t o  large (over 100%) reductions in the credentials effects. 
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Table 1: Sample Sizes for March, 1980 C P S  
Universe N 
All Records 136,712 
Excluding Spanish Supplemental Sample 135,573 
Basic Sample* 135,336 
White Males 56,558 
White Males with Positive Income 45,686 
White Male Movers 9,560 
White Males aged 40-55 11,571 
Each row, except for the last two, is a restriction on the universe of the preceding 
row. Each of the last two rows is part of the universe of white males with positive 
income. 1,239 people appear in both of the last two samples. 
*The basic sample excludes the Spanish supplemental sample and records with in- 
valid data. 
Table 2: Comparison of Samples for Calendar 1979 
Cells report either percentages or means with standard deviations in parentheses. 
See text for details of variables. Labor force related variables omitted where inap- 
propriate. 
'These refer to  the samples defined in Table 1 and the text: Basic (all valid data  
in regular sample), WM (white males), WM+ (white males with positive earnings), 
WM Mover (white male movers), and WM 40-55 (white males aged 40-55). 
N 
STATUS (%) 
Didn't work or want work 
Self-employed 
One employer and no job 
search 
Didn't work but searched or 
was discouraged 
Multiple Employers 
One part-year employer and 
job search 
Total 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
White (%) 
Male (%) 
Age (years) 
Experience (years) 
Highest Grade Completed 
LABOR FORCE DATA 
Hourly Earnings ($/hour) 
Log Hourly Earnings 
Earned Income ($) 
Weeks Worked 
Hours per Week 
Basic WM 
135,336 56,558 
30% 18% 
8 15 
45 50 
1 1 
11 13 
4 4 
100% 100% 
88% 100% 
47% 100% 
41.0 40.4 
(18.8) (18.3) 
22.3 
(18.8) 
11.6 11.9 
(3.2) (3.3) 
I 
SAMPLE* 
WM WM 
WM+ Mover 40-55 
45,686 9,560 11,571 
0% 0% 0% 
17 0 23 
62 0 66 
0 0 0 
16 75 7 
5 25 4 
100% 100% 100% 
100% 100% 100% 
100% 100% 100% 
37.3 29.5 47.3 
(14.9) (12.1) ( 4 4  
18.8 11.3 28.8 
(15.2) (12.4) (5e7) 
12.4 12.1 12.4 
(3.0) (2.8) (3.3) 
7.40 5.91 9.09 
(4.6) (4.0) (4.8) 
1.78 1.56 2.03 
(0.76) (0.70) (0.68) 
14,768 9,334 19,891 
(11,084) (8,004) (11,381) 
45.1 37.8 49.3 
(13.2) (14.4) (7.7) 
41.2 39.2 44.4 
I (11.5) (11.3) (9.0) 
Table 3: Percentage of Extreme Values Recoded 
Variables were recoded t o  the indicated extreme values if they were more extreme. 
For example, any cases with experience less than 0 were coded as having experience of 
0. The table reports the percentage of cases recoded for each variable in each sample. 
The recoding intended t o  limit the influence of single, questionable values on the 
da ta  analysis. Recoding of hours/week preceded calculation of hourly earnings. 
SAMPLE* 
W M  WM 
WM+ Mover 40-55 
'These refer t o  the samples defined in Table 1 and the text: WM+ (white males 
with positive earnings), WM Mover (white male movers), and WM 40-55 (white 
males aged 40-55). 
Experience < 0 
Hourslweek > 70 
Hourly Earnings > $24/hr 
Hourly Earnings < $.lO/hr 
N 
0.3% 0.7% 0.0% 
1.7 1.3 2.4 
1.4 0.8 1.9 
0.5 0.1 0.5 
45,686 9,560 11,571 
Table 4: Simulations For Movers 
N= 9,560. This is for white, male movers in the 1980 CPS. The last three columns 
summarize data produced under the indicated assumption. Each row gives the 
mean and, in parentheses, standard error of the corresponding regression coefficient. 
Except for the first column, these are derived from 200 simulations, as described in 
the text. 
The "no credentials" simulation assigns scores for ranking based on 
score = 0.364 + .069S + .054X - . 0 0 0 8 9 ~ ~  + r ,  
Equal 
Sizes 
-.091 
(.007) 
.I14 
(.001) 
- .0020 
(.0001) 
.078 
(.OOO) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
- .0020 
(.OOOO) 
.lo2 
(.003) 
.I74 
(.002) 
.054 
(.002) 
.614 
(.OOO) 
where S is years of schooling, X is experience, and the Gaussian error term has 
standard deviation 0.627. The other simulations use scores based on the coefficients 
and equation under "Actual Data." 
No 
Credentials 
.267 
(.008) 
.087 
(.OM) 
-.0007 
(.0001) 
.056 
(.OOO) 
-.0009 
(.OOOO) 
- .0003 
(.oooo) 
-.010 
(.004) 
.003 
(.002) 
.003 
(.003) 
.631 
(.OOO) 
Coefficient 
Intercept 
Education 
Education2 
Experience 
Experience2 
ExpSEductn 
0 8  
Dl2 
Dl6 
Standard Error 
Actual 
Data 
- .036 
(. 107) 
.lo3 
(.020) 
-.0016 
(.0008) 
.077 
(.003) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0018 
(.0002) 
.lo6 
(.051) 
.I72 
(.024) 
.057 
(.040) 
.622 
Basic 
Simulation 
-.I22 
(.009) 
.I17 
(.002) 
- .002 1 
(.0001) 
.079 
(.OOO) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
- .0020 
(.OOOO) 
.lo2 
(.004) 
.I81 
(.002) 
.059 
(.009) 
.623 
(.ooo) 
Table 5: Simulations For Mature Males 
N = 11,571. This is for white males aged 40-55 in the 1980 CPS, as described in 
the text. See Table 4 for further details. The "No Credentialsn simulation is based 
on 
score = 0.906 + .070S + .014X - .00015x2 + c, 
where S is years of schooling, X is experience, and the Gaussian error term has 
standard deviation 0.647. 
Equal 
Sizes 
.281 
(.040) 
.I31 
(.003) 
-.0027 
(.0001) 
.04 1 
(.OOO) 
-.0004 
(.OOOO) 
- .0008 
(.0001) 
.021 
(.002) 
.061 
(.002) 
.I58 
(.002) 
.644 
(.OOO) 
No 
Credentials 
.599 
(.044) 
.I19 
(.003) 
-.0018 
(.0001) 
.019 
(.002) 
- .0002 
(.OOOO) 
- .0003 
(.0001) 
-.007 
(.002) 
-.010 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
.649 
(.OOO) 
Coefficient 
Intercept 
Education 
 ducati ion^ 
Experience 
~ x ~ e r i e n c e ~  
Exp*Eductn 
Ds 
0 1 2  
Dl6 
Standard Error 
Actual 
Data 
.422 
(.502) 
.099 
(.030) 
-.0015 
(.0007) 
.039 
(.024) 
- .0005 
(.0007) 
- .0006 
(.0007) 
.025 
(.042) 
.078 
(.024) 
.I87 
(.036) 
0.65 
Basic 
Simulation 
.I61 
(.041) 
.I38 
(.003) 
- .0028 
(.0001) 
.043 
(.002) 
- .0005 
(.OOOO) 
-.0010 
(.0001) 
.020 
(.004) 
.070 
(.002) 
.I61 
(.002) 
.650 
(.ooo) 
Table 6: Analysis of the Education-Earnings Relationship for Movers 
Regressions of log hourly earnings on indicated dependent variables. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. 
G is the size of the educational group; M is the cumulative number of people below 
a given grade plus half the size of that grade. Both are in units of 1,000. 
Coefficient 
Intercept 
Education 
Education2 
Experience 
Experience2 
Exp*Eductn 
DS 
0 1 2  
Dl 6 
M (1,000's) 
G (1,000's) 
R2 
Standard Error 
of Estimate 
N= 9,560. This is for white male movers in the 1980 CPS, as described in the text. 
2 
-.345 
(.094) 
.I60 
(.013) 
-.0027 
(.0005) 
.081 
(.003) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0020 
(.0002) 
.21 
0.62 
9 
.029 
(.105) 
.lo0 
(.020) 
-.0017 
(.0010) 
.075 
(.003) 
- .0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0018 
(.0002) 
.lo3 
(.050) 
.I76 
(.030) 
.063 
(.042) 
.001 
(.013) 
.22 
0.59 
10 
.031 
(-104) 
.097 
(.020) 
-.0014 
(.0009) 
.075 
(.003) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0018 
(.0002) 
.096 
(.050) 
.I59 
(.039) 
.053 
(.042) 
.005 
(.009) 
.22 
0.59 
3 
- .036 
(.107) 
,103 
(.020) 
-.0016 
(.0008) 
.077 
(.003) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0018 
(.0002) 
.lo6 
(.051) 
.I72 
(.024) 
.057 
(.040) 
.21 
0.62 
6 
.895 
(.015) 
.051 
(.OOl) 
-.0008 
(.oooo) 
.068 
(.002) 
.21 
0.59 
Equation 
7 
-.085 
(.099) 
.I34 
(.014) 
-.0034 
(.0005) 
.076 
(.003) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0018 
(.0002) 
.040 
(.008) 
.22 
0.59 
8 
- .079 
(.096) 
.I10 
(.015) 
-.0007 
(.0006) 
.077 
(.003) 
-.0010 
(.OOOO) 
-.0019 
(.0002) 
.034 
(.005) 
.22 
0.59 
Table 7: Analysis of the Education-Earnings Relationship for Mature White Males 
Regressions of log hourly earnings on indicated dependent variables. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. 
Coefficient 
Intercept 
Education 
Education2 
Experience 
Experience2 
Exp*Eductn 
D8 
0 1 2  
Dl6 
M (1,000's) 
G (1,000's) 
R2 
Standard Error 
of Estimate 
N = 11,571. This is for white males aged 40-55 in the 1980 CPS, as described in 
the text. 
8 
446 
(.503) 
.080 
(.029) 
.0004 
(.0005) 
.040 
(.024) 
- .0005 
(.0003) 
-.0007 
(.0007) 
.004 
(.004) 
.10 
0.65 
Equation 
7 
.415 
(.504) 
.084 
(.024) 
-.0002 
(.0006) 
.04 1 
(.024) 
- .0005 
(.0003) 
-.0007 
(.0007) 
.013 
(.009) 
.10 
0.65 
2 
.455 
(.503) 
.082 
(.029) 
.0003 
(.0005) 
.039 
(.024) 
-.0005 
(.0003) 
-.0006 
(.0007) 
.10 
0.65 
9 
.387 
(.503) 
.lo4 
(.030) 
-.0027 
(.0009) 
.041 
(.024) 
- .0005 
(.0003) 
-.0007 
(.0007) 
.039 
(.042) 
.036 
(.031) 
.205 
(.037) 
.028 
(.013) 
.10 
0.65 
3 
.422 
(.502) 
.099 
(.030) 
-.0015 
(.0007) 
.039 
(.024) 
- .0005 
(.0007) 
-.0006 
(.0007) 
.025 
(.042) 
.078 
(.024) 
.I87 
(.036) 
.10 
0.65 
10 
.405 
(.503) 
.lo2 
(.030) 
-.0020 
(.0008) 
.040 
(.024) 
- .0005 
(.0003) 
-.0007 
(.0007) 
.049 
(.044) 
.I35 
(.040) 
.210 
(.038) 
-.012 
(.007) 
.10 
0.65 
6 
1.334 
(.141) 
.016 
(.010) 
- .0002 
(.0002) 
.070 
(.002) 
.10 
0.65 
References 
Albelda, R., Gunn, C., and Waller, W., editors (1987). Alternatives to Eco- 
nomic Orthodozy: A Reader in Political Economy. M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 
Armonk, New York. 
Althauser, R. P. (1987). Internal labor markets u.s.a.: a thematic review. 
Presented at the annual meetings of the ASA, Chicago. 
Baron, J. N. (1984). Organizational perspectives on stratification. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 10:37-69. 
Beck, E. M., Horan, P. M., and 11, C. M. T. (1978). Stratification in a dual 
economy: a sectoral model of earnings determination. American Sociolog- 
ical Review, 43:704-20. 
Benavot, A. (1985). Education and Economic Development in the Modern 
World. PhD thesis, Stanford University. Sociology Department. 
Berg, I. (1970). Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robery. Praeger 
Publishers, New York. 
Berg, I., Finegan, T. A., Bibb, R., and Swafford, M. (1981). Specification in the 
structural unemployment thesis: issues and prospects. In Berg, I., editor, 
Sociological Perspectives on Labor Markets, chapter 13, pages 347-367, 
Academic Press, New York. 
Blau, P. M. and Duncan, 0. D. (1967). The American Occupational Structure. 
Wiley, new york edition. 
Blaug, M. (1976). Human capital theory: a slightly jaundiced survey. Journal 
of Economic Literature, 14(3):827-855. 
Boudon, R. (1974). Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: changing 
Prospects in Western Society. Wiley series in Urban Research, John-Wiley 
& Sons, New York. A revised version of the 1973 French original. 
Boylan, R. D. (1986). A nonparametric, structuralist model of the matching of 
persons to entry-level jobs. Presented at the Annual Meetings of American 
Sociological Association in New York 
Bulow, J. I. and Summers, L. H. (1986). A theory of dual labor markets with 
application to industrial policy, discrimination, and keynesian unemploy- 
ment. Journal of Labor Economics, 4(3, Part 1):376-414. 
Chiswick, B. R. and Mincer, J. (1972). Time-series changes in personal income 
inequality in the united states from 1939, with projections to 1985. Journal 
of Political Economy, 80(3, part II):S34-S71. 
Collins, R. (1971). Functional and conflict theories of educational stratification. 
American Sociological Review, 36:1002-10019. 
Collins, R. (1979). The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Educa- 
tion and Stratification. Academic Press, New York. 
Dickens, W. T. and Lang, K. (1984). A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory. 
Working Paper 1314, Cambridge, Ma.: National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search. 
Featherman, D. L. and Hauser, R. M. (1978). Opportunity and Change. Aca- 
demic Press, New York. 
Frank, R. H. (1984). Are workers paid their marginal products? American 
Economic Review, 74:549-71. 
Granovet ter, M. (1981). Toward a sociological theory of income differences. 
In Berg, I., editor, Sociological Perspectives on Labor Markets, chapter 2, 
pages 11-48, Academic Press, New York. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91 (3):481-510. 
Heyneman, S. P. and Loxley, W. A. (1983). The effect of primary-school 
quality on academic achievement across twenty -nine high- and low-income 
countries. American Journal of Sociology, 88(6):1162-1194. 
Jencks, C. and eta1 (1972). Inequality: a reassessment of the eflect of family 
and schooling in America. Harper and Row, New York. 
Jencks, C. and et al. (1979). Who Gets Ahead? Basic Books, New York. 
Kalleberg, A. L. and S~rensen,  A. B. (1979). The sociology of labor markets. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 5:351-379. 
Kelley, J .  (1973). Causal chain models for the socioeconomic career. American 
Sociological Review, 38:481-493. 
Layard, R. and Psacharopoulos, G. (1974). The  screening hypothesis and the 
returns t o  education. Journal of Political Economy, 82(5):985-998. 
Lester, R. A. (1954). Hiring Practices and Labor Competition. Research Report 
Series 88, Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, Department 
of Economics and Sociology. Also appeared as a book of the same name. 
Lockheed, M., Jamison, D., and Lau, L. (1980). Farmer education and farmer 
efficiency: a survey. In King, T., editor, Education and Income, pages 111- 
152, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Mare, R. D. and Winship, C. (1984). The paradox of lessening racial inequality 
and joblessness among black youth: enrollment, enlistment, and employ- 
ment 1964-1981. American Sociological Review, 49:39-55. 
Medoff, J .  L. and Abraham, K. G. (1981). Are those paid more really more 
productive? Journal of Human Resources, 16:186-216. 
Mincer, J .  (1974). Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, New York. 
Piore, M. J., editor (1979). Unemployment and Inflation: Institutionalist and 
Structuralist Views. M. E. Sharpe, Inc, White Plains, N.Y. 
Rosen, S. (1977). Human capital: a survey of empirical research. In Ehrenberg, 
editor, Research in Labor Economics. 
Serensen, A. B. (1977). T h e  structure of inequality and the process of attain- 
ment. American Sociological Review, 42(6):965-978. 
Spence, M. A. (1974). Market Signaling: The Information Structure of Hir- 
ing and Related Processes. Volume 143 of Economic Studies ., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Stiglitz (1984). Theories of Wage Rigidity. Working Paper Series 1442, NBER, 
Cambridge, Ma. 
Stolzenberg, R. M. (1978). Bringing the boss back in: employer size, employee 
schooling, and socioeconomic achievement. American Sociological Review, 
43:813-828. 
Thurow, L. C. (1968). Disequilibrium and the marginal productivity of capital 
and labor. restat, 50(1):23-31. 
Thurow, L. C. (1975). Generating Inequality: Mechanisms of Distribution in 
the U.S. Economy. Basic Books, New York. 
Thurow, L. C. (1983). Dangerous Currents: The State of Economics. Random 
House, New York. 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1984). Current Popula- 
tion Survey: Annual Demographic File, 1980 (with 1980-Based Weights). 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, P.O. Box 
1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, second icpsr edition. ICPSR 8040. 
White, H. (1970). Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Orga- 
nizations. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma. 
Yellen, J. (1984). Efficiency wage models of unemployment. American Eco- 
nomic Review, 74(2):200-205. 
Recent Working Papers Produced in 
IIASA's Population Program 
Copies may be obtained a t  a cost of US $ 5.00 each from IIASA's 
Publications Department. 
WP-87-51, The Concentration of Reproduction: A Global Perspective by W. Lutz. June 
1987. 
WP-87-58, A Simple Model for the Statistical Analysis of Large Arrays of Mortality Data: 
Rectangular vs. Diagonal Structure by J. Wilmoth and G. Caselli. June 1987. 
W P-87-59, Sibling Dependences in Branching Populations by P.  Broberg. June 1987. 
WP-87-87, The Living Arrangements and Familial Contacts of the Elderly in Japan by K. 
Hirosima. September 1987. 
WP-87-92, The Demographic Discontinuity of the 1940s by N. Keyfitz. September 1987. 
WP-87-104, A Random-Efects Logit Model for Panel Data by D. Wolf. October 1987. 
WP-87-116, Some Demographic Aspects of Aging in the German Democratic Republic by 
T. Biittner, W. Lutz, and W. Speigner. November 1987. 
WP-88-10, On the Concentration of Childbearing in China, 1955-1981 by W. Lutz. 
February 1988. 
WP-88-13, Beyond "The Average American Family": U.S. Cohort Parity Distributions 
and Fertility Concentration by M. King and W. Lutz. March 1988. 
WP-88-23, Understanding Medical and Demographic Trends with MEDDAS by M. Rusnak 
and S. Scherbov. April 1988. 
WP-88-32, Kinship Patterns and Household Composition of the Elderly: Hungarian 
Women, 1984 by D. Wolf. April 1988. 
WP-88-36, "DIAL" - A System for Modeling Multidimensional Demographic Processes by 
S. Scherbov and V. Grechucha. May 1988. 
WP-88-44, Kin Availability and the Living Arrangements of Older Unmarried Women: 
Canada, 1985 by D. Wolf, T. Burch, and B. Matthews. June 1988. 
WP-88-46, Population Futures for Europe: An Analysis of Alternative Scenarios, by D. 
Wolf, B. Wils, W.  Lutz, and S. Scherbov. June 1988. 
WP-88-90, Comparative analysis of Completed Parity Distributions: A Global WFS- 
Perspective, by W. Lutz. October 1988. 
WP-88-104, Future Regional Population Patterns in the Soviet Union: Scenarios to the 
Year 1050, by S. Scherbov and W. Lutz. November 1988. 
WP-88-120, AIDS and HIV Surveillance in Europe, by M. Artzrouni and G. Heilig. 
December 1988. 
WP-88-124, DDMSLT: A Computer Program for Estimating the Duration-Dependent 
Multistate Life Table Model, by C. Calhoun. December 1988. 
WP-8405, Multi-State Analysis of Family Dynamics in Austria: Scenarios to the Year 
2090, by W. Lutz and S. Scherbov. January 1989. 
WP-8406, The Demographic Dimensions of Divorce: The Case of Finland, by W. Lutz, 
B. Wils, and M. Nierninen. 
